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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 6, 2008, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, amidst
much controversy, placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government
conservatorship.1 This decision triggered a massive run on the global
financial system that reverberates even today.2 These two government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) held half of all mortgages in the United
States. Now, four years later, they remain in government hands with no
clear exit. Some form of reform for the GSEs looms.
4
Yet, before reforming the secondary mortgage market it is important
to identify problems and goals. In identifying problems let me suggest two
guidelines that transcend partisan politics: first, axiomatically, if there is a
flaw in law and regulation, always blame the most powerful elements of
society and not the disempowered; second, follow the money-usually the
big monetary winners bear full responsibility for policy fiascos, especially if
they enjoy easy access to those with political power. In terms of policy goals,
as Adam Smith recognized centuries ago, laws that favor the disempowered
Director, Business and Corporate Governance Law Center, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law, Sramir3@luc.edu.
See Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending,
U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at Al; Press Release,
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (FHFA), Statement of FHFA Dir. James B. Lockhart 5 (Sept. 7,
2008), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23/FHFAStatement9708final.pdf.
2 See ANATOLE KALETSKY, CAPITALISM 4.0: THE BIRTH OF A NEW ECONOMY IN
THE AFTERMATH OF CRISIS 141-48 (2010).
3 Charles Duhigg, U.S. Likely to Keep the Reins on 2 Fallen Mortgage Giants,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at Al.
4 See Vicki Needham, Housing Regulator Releases Plan to Wind Down Fannie,
Freddie, THE HILL (Feb. 21, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1091-
housing/211849-housing-regulator-releases-plan-to-wind-down-fannie-freddie.
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must support sound policy, and laws that favor the "masters" must tend
toward corruption.5
Following these axioms, the problems arise from the corruption and
rigging of the secondary mortgage market by those that held the greatest
amount of power and pocketed the greatest profits. Thus, the fundamentally
racist effort to lay exclusive blame on "minority borrowers," or those who
hold the lowest degree of power and suffered the greatest degree of loss,
must fail as utter nonsense.6 These modem-day Bull Connors will suffer the
adverse verdict of history.
On the other hand, government efforts to expand home ownership
seem destined to fall into disrepute in a high inequality environment because
the very wealthy need no help to own homes. Further, untethering financial
elites from regulation seems destined to lead to rigged and manipulated
housing markets, especially if government picks up the tab in the end.
Applying these basic guidelines to recent problems in the secondary
mortgage market provides insight into sound policy going forward. This
article will first identify the causes of the mortgage market woes. Then, this
article seeks to identify sustainable and economically sound policy goals.
II. WHAT WENT WRONG?
There is no question that secondary market mortgage reform is very
important. There is no question the United States must do something. Today,
Fannie and Freddie executives enjoy private sector pay while their
businesses enjoy the backing of a government agency.7 The fundamental
questions are: (1) what is wrong with housing in the United States today?; (2)
what is wrong with the mortgage market?; and (3) what is wrong with the
securitization process?
5 STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE
CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW (forthcoming Dec. 2012) (citing ADAM SMITH, WEALTH
OF NATIONS 151 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776)).
6 See andrd douglas pond cummings, Racial Coding and the Financial Market
Crisis, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 141, 147-51, 207 (2011) ("The dirty little myth has transmogrified
slightly and now attaches full market crisis fault to minority borrowers, the Community
Reinvestment Act, and the federal government," including the GSEs).
7 See Derek Kravitz, Fannie, Freddie Executive Pay Limited, Bonuses Cut, USA
TODAY, Mar. 9, 2012, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/
management/story/2012-03-09/fannie-mae-freddie-mac-exec-pay/53439310/1. The taxpayers
fund huge private-sector compensation while guaranteeing the liabilities of the businesses-
amounting to $170 billion in bailout funds paid to date. Id. In fact, GSE executives make far
more than the President. Bruce Krasting, Another Sweet Deal For The Heads Of Fannie And
Freddie, BusINESS INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2012), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-03-
12/news/31146828 1 compensation-famnie-and-freddie-retention-bonuses#ixzzlpa319ri9. See
generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A
Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. CORP. L. 807
(2005) (examining the flaws in executive compensation at Fannie Mae).
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The mortgage market saw a tremendous spike in race-based
predatory lending during the subprime boom. 8 For example, in the second
half of 2006, at least half of all collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) issued
were issued pursuant to something known as the "Magnetar Trade."9 The
Magnetar Trade denotes a hedge fund strategy whereby the hedge fund
sponsors a CDO fund through an agreement to purchase the riskiest tranch-
known as the equity tranch.' ° At the same time, the hedge fund has input into
the selection of the CDO's collateral." Further, the hedge fund holds an
undisclosed short position on all other tranches of the CDO, and so it profits
when the CDO fails. 12 The hedge fund never effectively discloses these short
positions and their input into the selection of collateral to investors in the
CDO. 13 This produced a strange, never seen before, reality: the sponsor of
collateralized debt obligation funds (pools of mortgages) had a perverse
incentive to see the funds fail while simultaneously helping to select
mortgages to place in the funds.
14
What could be more predatory than the sabotage of mortgages, to go
looking for mortgages that were the most risky mortgages available, those
most likely to default? The SEC charged three financial giants with fraud. 5
Goldman Sachs paid a record fine of $550 million arising from its
involvement in the so-called Magnetar Trade.' 6 But, this strategy pervaded
Wall Street during the height of the subprime frenzy. 17
Unfortunately, the Magnetar Trade is only the tip of the iceberg in
terms of the pervasiveness of predatory lending. The state of Illinois
spearheaded a multistate predatory lending action against Countrywide
leading to an $8.7 billion dollar settlement (affecting over 400,000
homeowners nationwide).' 8 The U.S. Department of Justice recently settled
8 cummings, supra note 6, at 177-81 (stating that "predatory lending ran amok
in the run-up to the financial market crisis," especially in minority communities).
9 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 190-95 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]; Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, The
Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 9,
2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-magnetar-trade-how-one-hedge-fund-helped-
keep-the-housing-bubble-going.
10 Id. at 192.
11 Id.
12 See id.
13 id.
14 Eisinger & Bernstein, supra note 9.
15 Edward Wyatt, Citigroup to Pay Millions to End Fraud Complaint, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, at Al.
16 Steven A. Ramirez, The Real Subprime and Predatory Fraud (Fannie and
Freddie Acquitted Again and Again II), CORP. JUST. BLOG (Nov. 6, 2011, 6:41 PM),
http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/20 11/1 l/real-subprime-and-predatory-fraud.html.
Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase settled charges for $285 million and $153.6 million,
respectivel,. Id.Id.
18 Id. (citing Press Release, Il. Attorney Gen., Illinois Attorney General Madigan
Leads $8.7 Billion Groundbreaking Settlement of Lawsuit Against Mortgage Giant
2012] 463
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the largest fair lending lawsuit in the nation's history involving 200,000
victims of lending discrimination nationwide.' 9 Similarly, the Federal
Reserve fined Wells Fargo for predatory lending and steering involving
10,000 home mortgages. 20 According to a study cited by the Wall Street
Journal, 61% of all subprime loans in 2006 went to prime borrowers. 21 The
Los Angeles Times reported that 32 former Ameriquest employees "across
the country say they witnessed or participated in improper practices, mostly
in 2003 and 2004. This behavior was said to have included deceiving
borrowers about the terms of their loans, forging documents, falsifying
appraisals and fabricating borrowers' income to qualify them for loans they
couldn't afford., 22 Thus, massive predatory lending formed a core cause of
the subprime debacle.
The primary victims of this predatory lending were communities of
color-that is, the most disempowered elements of our society. An early
study showed that high income African-Americans were more likely to be
steered into subprime loans than even low income white borrowers.23 And,
"the bursting of the housing market bubble in 2006... took a far greater toll
on the wealth of minorities than whites. From 2005 to 2009, inflation-
adjusted median wealth fell by 66% among Hispanic households and 53%
among black households, compared with just 16% among white
households."24
We never saw this kind of predatory lending before in America.
What changed?
The nation suffered its highest economic inequality in its history.
According to economists, the more wealth that is concentrated in fewer
hands, the easier it is for elites to engage in collective action and to rig the
Countrywide (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.illinoisattomeygeneral.gov/
pressroom/2008_ 10/20081006.html; Helping Illinois Homeowners, LISA MADIGAN ATTORNEY
GENERAL, http://www.illinoisattomeygeneral.gov/pressroom/2008_10/20081006.html (last
visited Mar. 30. 2012)).
19 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Reaches $335 Million
Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial
Corporation (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/December/1 l-
ag- 1694.html.
20 Ramirez, supra note 16.
21 Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-
Worthy, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBI 19662974358911035.html.
22 Mike Hudson & E. Scott Reckard, Workers Say Lender Ran 'Boiler Rooms',
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
ameriquest4feb0405,1,5202756.story.
23 AMAAD RIVERA, BRENDA COTrO-ESCALERA, ANISHA DESAI, JEANNETTE HUEZO
& DEDRICK MUHAMMAD, FORECLOSED: STATE OF THE DREAM 2008 14-15 (2008), available at
http://www.faireconomy.org/files/StateOfDream_01_16 08 Web.pdf.
24 RAKESH KOCHHAR, RICHARD FRY, & PAUL TAYLOR, WEALTH GAPS RISE TO
RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS, HISPANICS 1 (July 26, 2011), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report7-26-1 1_FINAL.pdf.
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legal and regulatory system.25 Thus, high inequality leads to compromised
legal and regulatory systems.26 There is a wealth of economic literature about
the pernicious effects of inequality on a robust middle class.27
Simon Johnson and James Kwak focus on the concentrated
economic power of the financial sector as the crux of the problem driving the
financial crisis. 28 Emmanuel Saez shows a massive spike in individual
income inequality culminating in 2007, on the eve of the crisis. The top .01%
at that time (15,617 families with annual income above $7,890,000),
controlled 6% of national income; this was six times what the top .01%
controlled in the 1970s. 29 During this same period, the power of the CEO
over public firms also soared-a trend that I have termed "CEO primacy" in
public corporations. 30 In my forthcoming book, Lawless Capitalism: The
Subprime Crisis and the Case for an Economic Rule of Law, I term these
trends "a triple whammy" of economic concentration that drove all aspects of
the financial crisis.31
This radical concentration of economic power coincided with
allowing banks to get so large and so interconnected in such a non-
transparent way that the failure of one bank would take down the whole
financial sector.32 The largest banks used economic extortion to get
politicians to bail them out with massive government support-including
$180 billion to keep the GSEs afloat and further protect the so-called too-
25 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 127 (2nd ed. 1971) ("Since relatively small groups will frequently be
able voluntarily to organize and act in support of their common interests, and since large
groups normally will not be able to do so, the outcome of the political struggle among the
various groups in society will not be symmetrical .... [S]mall 'special interest' groups, the
'vested interests,' have disproportionate power.").
26 See Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman & Andrei Shleifer, The Injustice of
Inequality, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 199 (2003) ("[I]f political and regulatory institutions can
be moved by wealth or influence, they will favor the established, not the efficient.").
27 See, e.g., William Easterly, Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights
from a New Instrument, 84 J. DEV. ECON. 755 (2007); see infra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text (citing economic literature).
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KwAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 59 (2010) ("Something changed during the last quarter
century ... the financial sector just got bigger and bigger.").
29 Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the
United States (Updated With 2009 and 2010 Estimates) fig. 3 (March 2, 2012) (unpublished
article), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/saez-UStopincomes-20 1 0.pdf.
30 Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of
Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 346 (2007).
31 RAMIREZ, supra note 5.
32 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xvi-xvii ("Panic fanned by a lack of
transparency of the balance sheets of major financial institutions, coupled with a tangle of
interconnections among institutions perceived to be 'too big to fail,' caused the credit markets
to seize up."). See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE
HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004) (discussing the idea of "too big to fail").
2012]
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big-to-fail banks.33 The implicit government guarantee caused banks and
financial institutions to take more risks in the mortgage market than ever
before.34
Derivatives deregulation also led to uncontrolled risk. As noted
above, collateralized debt obligation funds derive their value from
underlying collateral such as pools of mortgages.35 And, like those CDOs
involved in the Magnetar Trade, derivatives can hide risks.36 Undisclosed
risks can trigger sudden shifts in risk perception that feed panics, as investors
flee newly realized risks at once.
37
Consider the failure of Lehman Brothers. On the eve of its failure,
Lehman Brothers had 900,000 derivatives contracts, and owed $40 of debt
for each dollar of equity-meaning that only a 2.5% decline in asset values
would render it insolvent.38 They also held massive investments in real
estate.39 It is difficult for anyone, even a sophisticated investor, to make an
intelligent investment choice on a firm that has 900,000 derivatives
contracts. It is impossible to measure such risks. When risk perceptions
shifted, Lehman suffered an electronic run that ultimately forced the highly
leveraged firm into bankruptcy. 4 Investors lost confidence in Lehman and
33 See Julie Andersen Hill, Shifting Losses: The Impact of Fannie's and Freddie's
Conservatorships on Commercial Banks, 35 HAMLINE L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) ("[T]he
FHFA's conflicting mandates encourage the Enterprises to shift losses to smaller banks while
absorbing losses that could be passed on to large banks, potentially exacerbating the problem
of banks that are too big to fail.").
34 See OFFICE OF FED. Hous. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, SYSTEMIC RISK: FANNIE MAE,
FREDDIE MAC AND THE ROLE OF OFHEO 42 (2003) (explaining how the perception that the
government would guarantee GSE debt caused less stringent credit limits); John C. Dugan,
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before the
Exchequer Club 6 (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2010/pub-speech-2010-84a.pdf ("[T]he recent financial crisis was caused
by a number of factors ... [including,] at the heart of it all, the worst mortgage underwriting
in our nation's history.").
35 See supra text accompanying notes 9-14 (explaining the "Magnetar Trade").
36 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xx.
17 See id. ("Within the financial system, the dangers of this debt were magnified
because transparency was not required or desired. Massive, short-term borrowing, combined
with obligations unseen by others in the market, heightened the chances the system could
rapidly unravel.").
38 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xix, 65; Carol J. Loomis, Derivatives: The Risk
that Still Won't Go Away, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/22/news/
economy/derivatives regulationrisks.fortune/index.htm (last updated June 24, 2009)
(regarding Lehman's failure, "blame can be laid first on out-of-control leverage and bad
investments in commercial real estate"). With only one dollar of equity supporting $41 in
assets, a decline of 2.44% in asset values wipes out all equity.
39 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xx ("By the end of 2007, Lehman had amassed
$111 billion in commercial and residential real estate holdings and securities, which was
almost twice what it held just two years before, and more than four times its total equity.").
40 See id. at 324-343 (providing a detailed explanation of the events that led to
Lehman's downfall).
466 [Vol. 35:461
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ultimately the entire financial sector.4' Given these risks, and its thin capital
base relative to debt, Lehman's failure seemed inevitable.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")
4 3
made it harder to sue for securities fraud. 4 The securitization of mortgages is
a security.45 When someone lies in connection with the purchase or sale of a
securitized mortgage pool, a claim arises under the federal securities laws.46
Unbelievably, the PSLRA actually exempts "forward looking" securities
fraud from civil liability.47 Further, it requires a higher level of proof of
scienter (before discovery) than ever before.41 So, fraudulent mortgage
securitizations could proceed with less risk of liability under the federal
securities laws than ever before.
Then there is the problem of massive accumulation of dollar
currency reserves by developing nations. These nations accumulate dollar
reserves to suppress the value of their currency relative to the dollar.49 So, for
example, China buys dollar assets with Yuan, which constricts the supply of
dollar assets and places more Yuan supply into the global financial system.
This helps nations export to the United States and renders U.S. labor
relatively less competitive. It also lowers interest rates on U.S. debt
instruments, including mortgage backed securities.50 The price of U.S. debt
was cheap, which resulted in an overabundance. This contributed towards
excessive debt in our society.5' It also helps transnational corporations by
lowering the cost of manufacturing in developing nations and making
52products relatively cheaper for consumers in developed nations.
41 Id. at xx, xxi, and 65.
42 Id. at 325 ("[S]ome institutional investors believed it was a matter not of
whether Lehman would fail, but when.").
43 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-66, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
44 Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation:
Dealing with the Meritorious As Well As the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1072
(1999).
45 See Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65-66 (noting that one type of financial instrument that is
responsible for the secondary mortgage market collapse, the Collateralized Debt Obligation, is
a security).
46 See generally Christopher J. Miller, Note, "Don't Blame Me, Blame the
Financial Crisis": A Survey of Dismissal Rulings in JOB-5 Suits for Subprime Securities
Losses, 80 FoRDHAM L. REv. 273 (2011) (discussing cases involving securities fraud in the
context of mortgage-related securities created during the financial crisis).
47 Ramirez, supra note 44, at 1076.
48 Id at 1074.
49 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 419-20.
50 See id; Steven A. Ramirez, Taking Economic Human Rights Seriously After
the Debt Crisis, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 713 (2011).
51 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 419-20 (dissenting statement of Keith
Hennessy, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and Bill Thomas).
52 See Steven A. Ramirez, American Corporate Governance and Globalization,
18 LA RAZA L.J. 47, 53-54 (2007).
2012]
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All of these problems from financial deregulation to the structure of
globalization to the PSLRA benefited CEOs, especially CEOs in the
financial sector. Indeed, their compensation soared even as investors lost
mightily.53 In terms of the nation's mortgage market, elites rigged the entire
system towards failure by using their power to free themselves from a wide
array of regulatory constraints.
With all these extraneous problems (and many more) which
negatively impacted the secondary mortgage market, one may wonder
whether the GSEs contributed at all to the crisis. 54 Both the Bush and Clinton
Administration imposed affordable housing mandates upon the GSEs.
55
Thus, it strains credulity to claim that the GSEs played zero role in a real
estate market bubble (and bust) driven by subprime mortgages to lower
income borrowers. On the other hand, the FCIC dissent correctly argued that
there was a global real estate bubble, and the GSEs operated only in the
United States.56 Further, the GSE portfolios greatly outperformed private
label mortgage backed securities issuers.57 The FCIC commissioners reached
broad agreement that the GSEs did not solely cause the financial crisis
although they were one of many contributing factors.58 That seems
reasonable.
This counsels caution. Due to the fact that the crisis is rooted in a
variety of causes, many of which are extraneous to the secondary mortgage
market, reform of that market should proceed carefully. If the secondary
53 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of
Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 257, 272-73 (2010) (analyzing the net financial payoff for Bear Steams and Lehman
executive teams during 2000-2008 and concluding that "performance-based" compensation
more than made up for paper losses from exposing the firms to high risk investments); Steven
A. Ramirez, Lesson from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 ST. LouIs
U. L.J. 1, 6 (2009) (discussing the distorted consequences of risk-taking conduct by CEOs that
leads to high financial payoffs in executive compensation "while offloading staggering risks"
of losses onto the corporation and the global economy); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton,
Investment Bankers' Culture of Ownership 4-5, 18-20 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1664520 (reviewing executive compensation of the
CEOs at the 14 largest firms involved in the 2008 financial crisis and concluding that
compensation arrangements created perverse incentives for excessive risk-taking that resulted
in positive~payoffs for the CEOs, while the shareholders suffered large losses).
See cummings, supra note 6, at 151-203 (comprehensively analyzing the
causes of the financial crisis).
55 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xxvii.
56 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 415-16 (dissent of Keith Hennessey, Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, and Bill Thomas).
57 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xxvi.
58 Compare FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xxvi ("We conclude that these two
entities contributed to the crisis, but were not a primary cause."), with FCIC REPORT, supra
note 9, at 437 (containing the dissenting views of FCIC commissioners, which conclude that
"Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not by themselves cause the crisis, but they contributed
significantly in a number of ways"). One of the ten commissioners assigns much more blame
to the GSEs. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 441-538 (dissent of Peter J. Wallison).
[Vol. 35:461
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mortgage market is a victim of a shotgun blast to the torso, then brain
surgery is ill-advised.
III. WHAT POLICY GOALS CAN SUCCEED ECONOMICALLY?
Not long ago, the housing market in the United States functioned
well. After New Deal Reforms (which included the formation of Fannie
Mae), home ownership soared. 59 New methods of home finance became the
norm-including the thirty-year mortgage. 60 This meant jobs in the housing
industry that frequently served as a catalyst for exiting recessions, as low
interest rates from economic slack would naturally spur housing. 61 It also
meant anchoring the middle class more firmly in the American economy in a
way that only home ownership can accomplish. 2 Indeed, home ownership
became the spine of the middle class economic fortunes after the New
Deal.63
Fannie Mae was formed during the Great Depression. 64 Thereafter,
from the 1930s until 2003 or 2004 when the bubble really got quite
excessive, housing in America was a bright spot.65 It was a success. It
fomented a robust middle class and there are many stories of families who
moved from lower class status to middle class status and beyond largely on
66the back of housing. We used wealth in the form of housing to fund
retirements, we used wealth in the form of housing appreciation to send kids
to college, and, historically, there is a tight correlation between housing
market appreciation and GDP.67
59 See Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The
Role and Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REv. 1489, 1495-1500
(2011).
60 See id. at 1545 n.254.
61 See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265,281-84 (2012).
62 See Boyack, supra note 59, at 1499.
63 Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62
MD. L. REv. 515, 559-61 (2003).
64 National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 1, 48 Stat. 1246, 1246 (1934)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006)).
65 Boyack, supra note 59, at 1492 ("For decades, the U.S. mortgage finance
system was the envy of the world-the only industrialized nation to have a significant
segment of housing costs covered by private capital through a securitization investment
system." (footnote omitted)).
66 See Kai Wright, The Assault on the Black Middle Class, AM. PROSPECT (June
26, 2009), http://prospect.org/article/assault-black-middle-class ("Homeownership has been a
crucial building block of middle-class wealth ever since Jefferson promoted land-tenure laws
that favored freeholders and Lincoln signed the Homestead Act. Today, housing represents
nearly two-thirds of all middle-class wealth.").
67 See Adam Hersh, Economic Recovery is Still Threatened, MARKETWATCH
(Jan. 27, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-01-27/commentary/ 30764560_1
quarter-of-econoic-expansion-fourth-quarter-growth-gdp. One commentator explains:
2012]
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Further, one cannot build houses in China to sell in America. Jobs in
the housing sector cannot be outsourced. This means that a robust housing
industry can operate to stabilize employment in a globalized economy.
Typically, housing has led the economy out of recessions.68 Today many
commentators argue that there will be no robust recovery without a recovery
in housing.69 Government sponsored loans account for up to seventy-five
percent of today's mortgage market.7°
Therefore, government policies that support and stabilize home
ownership contribute to a robust middle class and should be pursued in a
sustainable manner, particularly during an economic downturn. 71 Trying to
expand home ownership when an economy is shredding jobs will not work.
Unfortunately, the Bush Administration's efforts to pursue broader home
ownership in the face of contracting employment failed miserably.72 The
futility of this effort is manifest in the employment ratio, the broadest
measure of employment:
73
[Iln typical recessions residential investment tends to lead the
recovery, up 23% on average at this point in the business cycle, [but] at
present it is languishing more than 45% below its pre-recession level....
[R]esolving weakness and uncertainty in the real estate market are central
to boosting both household consumption and residential investment.
Id.
68 Chris Isidore, Desperate for a Housing Rebound, CNNMoNEY (June 2, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/02/news/economy/housing-economy/index.htm ("Housing
typically helps lead the way in an economic recovery not only through a surge of construction
and the hiring that goes with it, but through demand for goods and services that go into
forming a new household.").
69 Robert Reich, Housing is the Rotting Core of the US Recovery, FIN. TES
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dI 0dd468-6136-1 lel-a738-
00144feabdc.html#axzzlnguOtyFP ("[The negative wealth effect of home values, combined
with declining wages, makes it highly unlikely the US will enjoy a robust recovery any time
soon.").
70 See Boyack, supra note 59, at 1526 n.159.
71 Lawrence H. Summers, To Fix the Economy, Fix the Housing Market,
REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/lawrencesummers/2011/10/24/to-fix-the-
economy-fix-the-housing-market/.
72 See Bush Aims to Boost Minority Home Ownership, CNN (June 17, 2002),
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-06-17/politics/bush.minority.homes_1_home-ownership-home-
buyers-american-dream-down-payment-fund?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS.
73 Civilian Employment-Population Ratio, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis,
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EMRATIO (last updated May 1, 2012).
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The lesson is that expanding home ownership makes sense unless an
economy fails to produce job growth and earnings growth to sustain more
mortgage debt.
74
Still, do we need the GSEs in their current form? The private
governance structure serves no discernible policy goal. The GSEs used
millions to influence lawmakers and escape appropriate regulation.75 The
FCIC termed the GSEs the "kings of leverage. 76 No private actor should
benefit from a government guarantee except in narrow circumstances and for
limited purposes under government supervision." The GSEs even aroused
the SEC which presently claims that the GSE executives committed
securities fraud.78 Finally, the GSEs invested in subprime loans in a reckless
manner (and at an inopportune time).79 In short, the GSEs were corrupt and
reckless.
Nevertheless, a government agency that exists to assure that loans
are well-documented and well-underwritten may benefit the secondary
market and will certainly benefit the U.S. economy, just as the GSEs did in
74 I argued in 2006 that the current structure of globalization would create a crisis
in buying power and too much debt. See Steven A, Ramirez, Endogenous Growth Theory,
Status Quo Efficiency, and Globalization, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4 (2006).
75 FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xxvi.
76 Id. at xx.
77 See id at xxvi-xxvii.
78 See Nick Timiraos & Chad Bray, SEC Brings Crisis-Era Suits, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 17, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020373330 4 5 77 1
02310955780788.html.
79 Boyack, supra note 59, at 1516-18.
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the past.8° Such a function facilitates the flow of capital into the nation's
housing market by allowing banks to recycle their scarce capital into new
loans.81 Creating mortgage backed securities consisting of geographically
diverse mortgages reduces risks to local and regional banks.82 Such securities
also provide a safe haven for investors seeking low-risk but higher returns
than sovereign debt.83 Guaranteeing such safe debt instruments need not cost
the government and taxpayers in a well-regulated mortgage market where the
government guarantee backs only the highest quality mortgages.8 4 This
function secures lower cost capital for home mortgages for the middle
class.85
Indeed, this function of facilitating a safe and sound secondary
mortgage market is so important that no private actor should add to the costs
of such a program or benefit from the government guarantee. Thus, the cost
of private compensation and other executive benefits should be eliminated in
favor of government sector salaries, benefits, and job security. This would
eliminate the core problem arising from the GSEs and create an appropriate
blend of private and government functions.
Further, a model for this type of government guarantee program
already exists-the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The
FDIC is a self-funded, independent agency.86 The FDIC administers bank
deposit insurance, backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.87 It
charges insurance premiums for the risks it assumes and enjoys broad
regulatory power to control the risks it assumes. 88 Moreover, banks that fail
to comply with safe and sound lending practices lose deposit insurance.
89
The proper and detailed institutional design of a federal mortgage guarantee
corporation is beyond the scope of these remarks. Yet, a compelling case can
be made for the need for such an agency.90
8 See id. at 1539-54.
81 See id. at 1540 (stating that "reductions in GSE market activity would
markedly increase uncertainty in the finance capital available for single family and
multifamily residential mortgages").
82 Mark L. Korell, The Workings of Private Mortgage Bankers and Securitization
Conduits, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 91, 96 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman
eds., 1996).
83 See id. at1551.
84 See id. at 1557-58.
85 See id. at 1543-47 (explaining how, without the GSEs, the cost of mortgage
capital will increase significantly).
86 See History of the FDIC, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/about/history/index.html
(last updated Jan. 20, 2012).
87 See Symbol of Confidence, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/consumersfbanking/
confidence/symbol.html (last updated July 20, 2010).
88 FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders, FDIC, https://www5.fdic.gov/
EDO/index.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2012).
89 id.
90 See Jacob Werrett, Note, Achieving Meaningful Mortgage Reform, 42 CONN. L.
REv. 319, 349-64 (2009).
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The residential real estate market still stagnates under declining
values.91 The government cannot withdraw its support from that sector
without courting another brush with economic disaster. There are many
proposals for reform; but no proposal that seeks to revert to a pre-Depression
privatized mortgage market should be taken seriously. The United States is
the only industrialized nation to offer thirty-year mortgages, as a result of the
GSEs. 92 Eliminating this mortgage product would cause a long and deep
disruption of the nation's housing market.
93
Given the historic success of the United States in fostering home
ownership, reformers should be reluctant to radically experiment with
untested or, worse, failed approaches. The destruction of sound legal and
regulatory infrastructure after decades of economic stability drove this crisis.
Reverting to yesteryear's laissez-faire ideology will lead to yesteryear's
serial economic disasters. Today, the urgent need is to stabilize the real estate
market, even if some gains in home ownership must be forfeited due to
economic stagnation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The GSEs played an important role in U.S. economic prosperity
since their creation as part of the New Deal in the 1930s. The recent setbacks
of the GSEs should not detract from the success they achieved in capitalizing
middle class home ownership. The GSEs require restructuring, not abolition.
That restructuring should focus on supporting a robust middle class and
avoid any further benefits to the very wealthy and powerful.
91 Shobhana Chandra, Home Prices in 20 U.S. Cities Decline 4%, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-28/home-prices-in-20-u-s-cities-
decline-4-.html.
92 Boyack, supra note 59, at 1493.
9' Id. at 1537-54.
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